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Abstract 6
This paper offers interpretations and applications of the “fear of ruin” coefﬁcient (Aumann and Kurz, 1977,
Econometrica). This coefﬁcient is useful for analyzing the behavior of expected utility maximizers when they face
binary lotteries with the same worse outcome. Comparative statics results of “more fear of ruin” are derived. The
partial ordering induced by the fear of ruin coefﬁcient is shown to be weaker than that induced by the Arrow-Pratt
coefﬁcient.
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Thispaperoffersvariousinterpretationsofarisk-aversioncoefﬁcient,[u(w)−u(0)]/u (w)in 14
standard notation, that was ﬁrst introduced by Aumann and Kurz (1977). This coefﬁcient, 15
coined the “fear of ruin” (FR) coefﬁcient, captures an individual’s “attitude toward risking 16
his fortune.”1 There has not been to date any systematic analysis of this coefﬁcient. This 17
paperﬁllsthisgapbyidentifyingsituationsinwhichtheFRcoefﬁcientcontrolsthebehavior 18
ofexpectedutilitymaximizers.Thesesituationsinvolvechoicesamongbinarylotterieswith 19
aﬁ xedw orse outcome. 20
1. Fear of ruin in the small and in the large 21
How much would an individual be willing to pay to be fully insured against the possibility 22
of ruin? Suppose that this individual maximizes his expected utility, with an increasing von 23
Neumann Morgenstern utility function u and current wealth w (assume w>0). He may 24
lose his entire wealth w with probability p. The insurance premium z(p)i sdeﬁned by2 25
u(w − z(p)) = (1 − p)u(w) + pu(0). (1)
∗To whom correspondence should be addressed.
1Aumann and Kurz note that this interpretation is an outcome of a conversation they had with Kenneth Arrow.
2The model could allow any arbitrary wealth w in the case of ruin. Here, we simply assume, without loss of
generality, that w = 0. We also assume that u(0) is ﬁnite.P1: GRA
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Assumethatu isdifferentiable.Differentiating(1)withrespectto p givesz (p) =
u(w)−u(0)
u (w−z(p)). 26
Supposethattheprobability p issmallenoughsothatz(p)maybereasonablyapproximated 27
by pz (0)since z(0) = 0.Aﬁrst-orderTaylorapproximationoftheinsurancepremium z(p) 28
is then given by z(p) ≈ p
u(w)−u(0)
u (w) . 29
This insurance premium “in the small” thus depends separately on the characteristics 30
of the risk and of the individual. In accord with intuition, the premium is proportional to 31
the probability of ruin p. Moreover, it depends on the characteristics of the individual’s 32
utility function only through the ratio
u(w)−u(0)
u (w) . Observe that this ratio is invariant to afﬁne 33
transformations of utility. 34
As in Aumann and Kurz (1977), we scale the utility function by assuming u(0) = 0. 35
This is done for expositional convenience and without loss of generality since the utility 36
function is deﬁned up to an afﬁne transformation. In this case, the insurance premium is 37
z(p) ≈ p
u(w)
u (w)
(2)
The coefﬁcient u/u  corresponds to the “fear of ruin” coefﬁcient, as it was ﬁrst introduced 38
by Aumann and Kurz (1977). From now, and throughout the paper, we will refer to u/u  as 39
the coefﬁcient of fear of ruin, or FR.3 40
Observe that our approximation for the insurance premium does not directly depend 41
on the Arrow-Pratt coefﬁcient, −u  /u . This is because we approximate this premium for 42
a small change in the probability p, not for a small change in the variation of terminal 43
wealth, as in Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1971). Consequently, we can derive a ﬁrst-order 44
approximation of the insurance premium by simply examining the rate of increase of the 45
insurance premium with respect to p.4 46
Furthermore, observe that u(w)/u (w)i sa lways strictly positive under u(·) increasing, 47
since u(0) = 0. Moreover, under risk-aversion, it is easy to see that this coefﬁcient always 48
increases with wealth w. Intuitively, there are two reasons why the insurance premium 49
increases with wealth. First, when the agent is wealthier, there is more to lose. As a result, 50
the agent is willing to pay more in the face of the risk of losing his entire wealth. This is 51
the effect related to the numerator, u(w), which increases in w. Second, under risk-averse 52
preferences, the marginal value of money is smaller when the agent is wealthier, so he is 53
willing to sacriﬁce a larger amount of money in face of the same risk. This effect is related 54
to the term 1/u (w), which also increases in w under risk-aversion. 55
Also,simplyobservethat,underriskneutrality,theFRcoefﬁcientreducestow.Moreover, 56
if u is concave, 57
u(w)
w
≥ u (w).
This inequality states that the slope of the tangent to the utility function at w is always 58
smaller than the slope of the chord drawn from 0 to w. Multiplying both sides of this 59
3Hence,thereadershouldrememberthattheappropriateFRcoefﬁcientinthegeneralcaseis[u(w)−u(0)]/u (w).
4Theequivalentﬁrst-ordereffectforavariationinterminalwealthiszeroinPratt,sothatheexaminesthesecond
order effect. See Gollier (2001, p. 21–24) for a detailed analysis of Pratt (1964)’s “in the small” approximation.P1: GRA
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inequality by w/u (w) shows that the FR coefﬁcient is always larger under risk-aversion 60
than under risk-neutrality. This is consistent with the intuitive requirement that one’s fear 61
of ruin is lower when one is risk-neutral.5 62
Previous remarks interpret FR as a measure of local risk aversion or local propensity to 63
insure against a small chance of ruin. We next examine comparative properties of the FR 64
coefﬁcient for any probability of ruin p.T od oso, we ﬁrst introduce two Deﬁnitions. 65
Deﬁnition 1.W e deﬁne z(u,w,p), the insurance premium of agent u facing the risk of 66
losing wealth w with probability p, by 67
u(w − z(u,w,p)) = (1 − p)u(w).
Deﬁnition 2.W e deﬁne c(u,w,p), the compensating premium of agent u facing the risk 68
of losing wealth w with probability p, by 69
u(w) = (1 − p)u(w + c(u,w,p)).
The quantity z(u,w,p)i sthe insurance premium that agent u with current wealth w is 70
willing to pay to avoid the possibility that a ruin occurs with probability p. The quantity 71
c(u,w,p)isthecompensatingpremiumthatagentu iswillingtoaccepttofaceapossibility 72
of ruin, namely to end up with wealth 0 with probability p or with wealth w + c(u,w,p) 73
otherwise. 74
Following the approach developed by Pratt (1964), we now compare the FR of two 75
individuals u and v for all w and p. Under the normalization at 0 adopted above, we 76
introduce the following natural deﬁnition of “more fear of ruin”. 77
Deﬁnition 3. Agent v is said to have more fear of ruin (FR) than agent u if and only if for 78
all w, 79
v(w)
v (w)
≥
u(w)
u (w)
.
Using the three Deﬁnitions above, we can now state the ﬁrst Proposition of this paper.6 80
Proposition1. Considertwoagentswithstrictlyincreasinganddifferentiableutilityfunc- 81
tions u and v such that u(0) = v(0) = 0.F o rall p ∈ [0,1] and all strictly positive wealth 82
w, the following four conditions are equivalent: 83
(i) Agent v has more I than agent u, namely
v(w)
v (w) ≥
u(w)
u (w); 84
(ii) Agentvhasahigherinsurancepremiumthanagentu,namelyz(v,w, p) ≥ z(u,w,p); 85
(iii) Agent v has a higher compensating premium than ¯ u, namely c(v,w, p) ≥ c(u,w,p); 86
5Moreover observe that the fear of ruin is even lower when preferences are risk-seeking.
6Detailed proofs are available upon request. See also Foncel and Treich (2003).P1: GRA
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(iv) There exists an increasing and differentiable function T(·) = v ◦ u−1(·) such that 87
T(0) = 0 and for all x,
T(x)
x is decreasing in x. 88
89
As k etch of the proof follows. We prove the equivalence between (i), (ii) and (iv). First, 90
(ii) implies (i) by (2). Second, we show that (i) implies (iv). Observe that since u and 91
v are increasing and differentiable functions, there always exists a unique, increasing and 92
differentiablefunctionT = v◦u−1 suchthatv = T ◦u.Also,v (0) = T ◦u (0) = T (0) = 0. 93
Moreover, from u
u  ≤ v
v , we have T  (u) ≤
T(u)
u , which must be true for all u. This latter 94
condition is equivalent to (iv). Third, we show that (iv) implies (ii). By Deﬁnition 1 95
v(w − z(u,w,p)) = T(u((w − z(u,w,p))) = T((1 − p)u(w)).
Since T(x)/x is decreasing in x,w eg e tT((1 − p)u(w)) ≥ (1 − p)T(u(w)). We thus have 96
v(w − z(u,w,p)) ≥ (1 − p)v(w) = v(w − z(v,w, p)). This implies (ii). The proof of the 97
equivalence between (i), (iii) and (iv) is similar. 98
The result would trivially generalize to a risk premium π(u,w,p), namely the insurance 99
premium net of the expected value of the risk π(u,w,p) = z(u,w,p) − pw. 100
2. Applications 101
In this section, we show that the FR coefﬁcient is applicable to a wide variety of models. 102
Consistent with the previous section, these applications involve choices among lotteries 103
with just two possible outcomes in which the worse outcome of the lotteries is the same, 104
equal to the “ruin point” (normalized to zero). 105
2.1. Value-of-statistical-life 106
Let us interpret u(0) in model (1) as the utility when dead. In other words, the ruin point is 107
the death point. The expected utility equals (1 − p)u(w); there is no bequest motive. The 108
value-of-statistical-life (VSL) is usually deﬁned as the rate of substitution between wealth 109
w and mortality risk p (see, e.g., Viscusi, 1993). We have 110
VSL =
dw
dp
=
u(w)
(1 − p)u (w)
=
FR[u(w)]
(1 − p)
where FR[u(·)] ≡ u(·)/u (·). In this simple model, it is clear that there is a one-to-one 111
relation between VSL and FR.A nindividual has, other things being equal, a higher VSL if 112
and only if he has more FR. 113
Let us slightly adapt the model now to allow for insurance opportunities. More precisely, 114
assume that there is an annuity market in which survivors are offered fair tontines shares 115
(Rosen, 1988). In a large group of identical individuals, a proportion p die and their wealth 116
is distributed to (1 − p) survivors. A survivor’s consumption thus equals initial wealth w 117P1: GRA
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plusthetontineshare pw/(1− p),thatisatotalofw/(1− p).Thestate-dependentexpected 118
utility thus equals (1 − p)u(w/(1 − p)) and we have 119
VSL = FR[u(w/(1 − p))] −
w
1 − p
There is still a one-to-one relation between VSL and FR in this model introduced by Rosen 120
(1988). 121
Interestingly, FR plays an important role in a life-cycle model as well. To see this point, 122
consider the following two-period model 123
V ≡ max
c
u(c) + β(1 − p)u(R(w − c))
where β is a discount factor, R the interest factor, c consumption in period 1 and (1 − p) 124
the survival probability from period 1 to period 2. (Observe again that there is no bequest 125
motive.) Then compute the VSL deﬁned by the rate of substitution between wealth w and 126
survival probability p, i.e. dw/dp =− (∂V
∂p /∂V
∂w). Using the Envelope Theorem, it is equal 127
to 1/(1 − p)R times the FR coefﬁcient computed at the optimal period 2 consumption.7 128
2.2. First-price auctions 129
Let us consider the standard ﬁrst-price auction model. There are N agents, i = 1,...,N 130
each with identical utility function u where u(0) = 0. They participate in an auction where 131
they all bid for an indivisible object. Each agent i has a private value xi for the object. 132
This value is drawn independently from a common distribution F(·) with density f (·)o n 133
a support [x, ¯ x]. The highest bidder wins the object. His payoff is the value of the object 134
minus the bid, i.e. xi − bi. Other bidders have payoff 0 (or 0 is the status quo). 135
Agent i chooses bi so as to maximize 136
piu(xi − bi),
with pi ≡ Pr(bi > B(x j),∀j  = i) and where B(·)i sthe optimal bidding strategy. It is 137
well-known that the ﬁrst order condition for the Nash equilibrium bidding strategy B(x)i s 138
given by the differential equation8 139
B (x) = (N − 1)
f (x)
F(x)
u(x − B(x))
u (x − B(x))
, withB(x) = x.
140
7GarberandPhelps(1997)indicatethatu/u  isa“centralcomponent”intheirlifetimemedicalspendingmodel.
Also, in a recent unpublished paper, Bommier (2003) shows that FR is a crucial coefﬁcient when one wants to
compare lotteries involving lives of different lengths. He calls the FR coefﬁcient the “general rate of substitution
between the length of life and consumption at the end of life”.
8See for instance Milgrom (2004, pages 123–125).P1: GRA
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What is the effect of increased risk aversion in the sense of more FR on the equilibrium
bidding function B(x)? Assume that bidders v have more FR and let us compare, ceteris
paribus, the outcome of a ﬁrst-price auction populated by bidders v instead of bidders u.9
Using straightforward notation we ﬁnd
B 
v(x) − B 
u(x) = (N − 1)
f (x)
F(x)
 
v(x − Bv(x))
v (x − Bv(x))
−
u(x − Bu(x))
u (x − Bu(x))
 
≥ (N − 1)
f (x)
F(x)
 
u(x − Bv(x))
u (x − Bv(x))
−
u(x − Bu(x))
u (x − Bu(x))
 
,
by
v(.)
v (·) ≥
u(·)
u (·). From that last result, we easily ﬁnd that, for all x, 141
Bv(x) = Bu(x)impliesB 
v(x) ≥ B 
u(x).
We thus have obtained a single crossing property. This property means that Bv can only 142
cross Bu from below. Since Bv(x) = Bu(x) = x, the function Bv(x) will always be larger 143
than Bu(x) for any x such that x ≥ x. Therefore, more FR always raises the bidding price 144
equilibrium. This ﬁnding leads to the following Proposition. 145
Proposition 2. The equilibrium price of a ﬁrst-price auction with independent private 146
values increases when bidders have more FR. 147
This result extends that of Milgrom and Weber (1982), who showed that introducing 148
risk-aversion raises the bidding price compared to the risk-neutral case. 149
2.3. Conﬂict and bargaining games 150
Aconﬂictgamemaybedescribedasfollows(see,e.g.,Skaperdas,1997).Twoagents,say1 151
and2,possessoneunitofaresource.Theymayconvertthisresourceandinvestitintoarms, 152
in quantities y1 and y2 respectively. The winner of the conﬂict gets a prize that depends on 153
the remaining productive resources of both agents, while the loser gets 0. The prize is a 154
function C ≡ C(1 − y1,1 − y2) which is increasing in both arguments. Let p ≡ p(y1, y2) 155
and 1− p denote the winning probability of agent 1 and 2 respectively, and u1 and u2 their 156
utilities so that they respectively maximize 157
pu1(C) and (1 − p)u2(C).
It can be shown that, in such a game, an agent with more FR always invests more into arms 158
and has a higher probability of winning the conﬂict when C is symmetrical. See Skaperdas 159
(1997, page 117, equation. 4). Moreover, when two identical agents simultaneously have 160
9The assumption that private values are independent of private characteristics, like risk-aversion, obviously
facilitates the comparative statics analysis here.P1: GRA
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more FR, the total amount invested into arms increases as well. The intuition for this is 161
straightforward. On the one hand, increasing investment into arms decreases payoff C in 162
the case of victory. On the other hand, increasing investment decreases the chance of losing 163
the conﬂict, and so helps to avoid ruin (notice that the loser’s payoff is the ruin point here). 164
The trade-off is thus similar to the one presented in the previous models. It is not surprising 165
that FR controls the amount of resources invested into arms in this model.10 166
AnotherapplicationinstrategicgamesistheNashbargainingproblem,asﬁrstnoticedby 167
Aumann and Kurz (1977, p. 1149). To see that, consider two agents u1 and u2 who bargain 168
over the division of a cake of size w. The well-known Nash solution to this problem calls 169
for maximizing 170
u1(y1)u2(y2) subject to y1 + y2 = w.
It is easy to show that this solution equates the two individuals’ FR computed at the optimal 171
bargaining points. The intuition is as follows (see also Svejnar, 1986): In the bargaining 172
problem, the ruin point u(0) = 0 can be interpreted as the threat utility if the bargaining 173
process fails. As a result, at each stage of the bargaining process, each agent considers a 174
gamble in which he risks losing the entire net gain which he has won so far against an 175
additional gain of a small amount. More fear of ruin thus reduces the willingness to accept 176
this gamble and so is a disadvantage in bargaining. See Roth and Rothblum (1982) for a 177
general analysis. 178
2.4. Contingent background risk 179
Take model (1) but replace the term u(w)b ythe term uε(w) ≡ Eεu(w + ˜ ε) and assume 180
E˜ ε = 0. The individual thus faces a background risk ˜ ε only if ruin does not occur. What 181
is the effect of this contingent background risk? From Proposition 1, it is clear that the 182
insurance premium always decreases if and only if 183
uε
u 
ε
≤
u
u 
Observethat,givenrisk-aversepreferences, E˜ ε = 0impliesuε(·) = Eu(.+˜ ε) ≤ u(·)bythe 184
Jensen inequality. Similarly, given prudence, E˜ ε = 0 implies u 
ε(·) = Eu (.+ ˜ ε) ≥ u (·)b y 185
the Jensen inequality. Hence, under the conditions of positive risk-aversion and prudence, 186
FR decreases with a contingent background risk. Some implications directly follow. For 187
instance, the VSL of risk-averse and prudent individuals decreases in face of a background 188
risk contingent on being alive.11 189
10The FR coefﬁcient is also at play in contest games (Skaperdas and Gan, 1995), or in rent-augmenting and
rent-seeking games (Konrad and Schlesinger, 1997). However, more FR is not enough to control the comparative
statics of more risk-aversion in those games as the loser’s payoff generally depends on the agents’ actions, and so
the ruin point varies.
11This observation relates to Eeckhoudt and Hammitt (2001)’s analysis of the effect of a ﬁnancial background
risk on the VSL.P1: GRA
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Let us now consider an implication of this observation concerning the ﬁrst-price auction 190
model. This implication arises when the value of the auctioned object is uncertain. Here, 191
we follow (Eso and White, 2004). Take the standard model of Section 3.2. Assume that the 192
private value of the auctioned object is no longer xi but instead is xi+ εi, where εi is the 193
realization of a random variable ˜ εi. Random variables ˜ εi are identically distributed as ˜ ε, 194
and are independent of private values xi. Thus, the highest bidder now receives an ex post 195
payoff xi + εi − bi. Losing bidders still receive payoff of 0. This model implies that the 196
background risk is contingent upon winning the auction. Ex ante, agent i chooses bi so as 197
to maximize 198
piEεu(xi + ˜ ε − bi) ≡ piuε(xi − bi)
with pi deﬁnedasabove.Itisimmediatelyclearthatthedifferentialequationcharacterizing 199
the equilibrium strategy in the noisy auction takes on the following form 200
B (x) = (N − 1)
f (x)
F(x)
uε(x − B(x))
u 
ε(x − B(x))
, with B(x) = x.
In other words, analyzing the effect of the noise ˜ ε on the equilibrium bidding price amounts 201
to comparing the equilibrium with utilities uε(·)t othe equilibrium with utilities u(·). This 202
leads to the following Proposition. 203
Proposition 3. Consider a ﬁrst-price auction with independent private values and with 204
risk-averse and prudent bidders. Then uncertainty over the value of the auctioned object 205
decreases the equilibrium price. 206
The intuition is two-fold. First, when preferences are risk-averse, utility is reduced if one 207
winstheobjectuε(·) ≤ u(·).Hence,theobjectislessdesirable.Second,givenprudence,the 208
marginal utility of income increases u 
ε(·) ≥ u (·). Individuals thus bid less aggressively in 209
thenoisyauctionbecausetheyvalueanextradollarofincomemore.ThisPropositionshows 210
that Eso and White (2004)’s result that decreasing absolute risk-averse (DARA) individuals 211
bid smaller amounts in a noisy ﬁrst-price auction also holds for any risk-averse prudent 212
bidders (i.e., DARA is sufﬁcient for prudence but the converse is not true). 213
Overall, these applications suggest that FR may be useful to sign various comparative 214
statics results in a large class of models used throughout the economics literature. 215
3. Comparison with the Arrow-Pratt and the asymptotic risk-aversion coefﬁcients 216
We have demonstrated in the previous section that more risk-aversion in the sense of FR 217
increasesthebiddingpriceinamodelofﬁrst-priceauctions,andalsocontrolsrisk-aversion 218
motivesinothermodels.Thisraisesthequestionoftheeffectofanincreaseinrisk-aversion 219
` al aArrow-Pratt in those models. The answer to the question is given in the present section, 220
as we precisely examine the link between FR and the Arrow-Pratt coefﬁcient. 221P1: GRA
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Following Jones-Lee (1980), it is useful to distinguish three different risk-aversion coef- 222
ﬁcients 223
FR[u(·)] ≡
u(·)
u (·)
AP[u(·)] ≡
−u  (·)
u (·)
(3)
AS[u(·)] ≡
u (·)
u∗ − u(·)
.
Thelastcoefﬁcientcorrespondstheasymptoticriskaversioncoefﬁcient(AS)introducedby 224
Jones-Lee (1980). The AS coefﬁcient measures the individual’s willingness to participate 225
in a “small-stake large-prize gamble.” It assumes that u is bounded above, where u∗ is the 226
supremum of u.12 227
The complementarity of these three coefﬁcients is apparent when one approximates 228
insurance premia “in the small.” Indeed, it is well-known that the Arrow-Pratt coefﬁcient 229
appears when considering risks with small gains and small losses. On the other hand, we 230
haveseenthattheFRcoefﬁcientappearswhentheriskisasmallprobabilityofruin.Finally, 231
the AS risk aversion coefﬁcient appears for a small loss/large gain risk, like gambling for 232
the jackpot. See Jones-Lee (1980) for an interesting presentation and discussion. 233
In this section, we ask: to what extent is an individual v who is more risk-averse than an 234
individual u in one speciﬁc sense also more risk-averse with respect to another sense? In 235
other words, we want to compare the partial orderings induced by these three risk-aversion 236
coefﬁcients. To do so, let the statement “v is more risk averse than u in the sense of I”b e 237
condensed into v ⊇I u and deﬁned as follows. 238
Deﬁnition 4. Consider the three coefﬁcients I ={ FR,AP,AS} as they are introduced in 239
(3). Then 240
(i) v ⊇FR u holds if and only if FR[v(w)] ≥ FR[u(w)] for all w, 241
(ii) v ⊇AP u holds if and only if AP[v(w)] ≥ AP[u(w)] for all w, 242
(iii) v ⊇AS u holds if and only if AS[v(w)] ≥ AS[u(w)] for all w. 243
Conversely, the ordering v ⊇ / Iu means that there exists w such that u is locally more 244
risk averse than v in the sense of I. 245
Theclaimthatanindividualv ismoreriskaversethananindividualu (inthesenseofAS, 246
APorFR)canbefullycharacterizedbysettingthecorrespondingpropertiesonafunction T 247
such that v = T ◦u. First, from Pratt (1964, Theorem 1) we know that v ⊇AP u if and only 248
if v = T ◦u with T increasing, twice differentiable and concave. Second, from Proposition 249
1, we know that v ⊇FR u if and only if v = T ◦ u where T is increasing, differentiable, 250
T(0) = 0 and T(x)/x decreasing in x. Finally, it is easy to show that v ⊇AS u if and 251
12What is actually important is that both the ruin point and u∗ are very bad and very good points beyond which
it is not possible to go. In particular, the utility u needs not be bounded above if we set an upper limit for wealth.P1: GRA
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Figure 1. Represents an increasing and concave function T with T(0) = 0. This function is such that T(x)/x >
T  (x) together with T  (x) >
T(¯ x)−T(x)
¯ x−x for all x ∈ [0, ¯ x].
only if v = T ◦ u where T is increasing, differentiable on [0, ¯ x] and T  (x) ≥
T(¯ x)−T(x)
¯ x−x , 252
with ¯ x = u∗ = supw u (w). Hence, the comparative analysis of the different risk-aversion 253
coefﬁcients can be presented by equivalent characterizations on such transformations T 254
without any reference to the underlying utility functions u and v.13 255
It is immediate that if a function T is concave on [0, ¯ x] then T(x)/x is decreasing in x, 256
which is equivalent to T(x)/x > T  (x), and to T  (x) ≥
T(¯ x)−T(x)
¯ x−x . Figure 1 illustrates this 257
result. First, observe on the ﬁgure that the slope of the chord drawn from the end-point ¯ x 258
to any point x1, i.e.
T(¯ x)−T(x1)
¯ x−x1 , is always lower than the slope of the tangent at this point 259
T  (x1). Second, observe that the slope of the chord drawn from the origin to any point x2, 260
i.e. T(x2)/x2,i slarger than the slope of the tangent at this point T  (x2). The results for 261
partial orderings are summarized as follows. 262
Proposition 4. Let u and v be two strictly increasing, twice differentiable and concave 263
functions that are bounded above with u∗ = supw u (w) and v∗ = supw v (w). Moreover, 264
assume that u (0) = v (0) = 0. Then v ⊇AP u implies: 265
(i) v ⊇FR u 266
(ii) v ⊇AS u. 267
ThisPropositionshowsthatifanagentismorerisk-averseintheclassicalsenseofAPthen 268
he is also more risk-averse in the sense of AS and FR. Proposition 4 is of clear mathematical 269
signiﬁcance. As mentioned above, v is more risk-averse than u in the sense of AP if and 270
only if v is obtained by a concave transformation of u. This is a very intuitive mathematical 271
property, as any coefﬁcient of curvature of a function should in principle increase when one 272
13In order to compare these different characterizations T,w eneed to restrict our attention to any increasing,
differentiable T deﬁned over [0, ¯ x] and such that T(0) = 0.P1: GRA
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“concaviﬁes” a function. The Proposition shows that this is actually the case for AS and FR 273
coefﬁcients. 274
Proposition4showsthat⊇FR and⊇AS areweakerorderingsthan⊇AP.Moreover,itispos- 275
sible to show that these orderings are strictly weaker. To see this, take the function T1 (x) = 276
(x − 2)3 + 8 over the interval [0, ¯ x] where ¯ x = 2.8.This function is such that T1(x)/x is 277
decreasing in x over this entire interval while T   
1 (x) > 0 together with
T1(¯ x)−T1(x)
¯ x−x > T  
1(x) 278
for some x over this interval. In other words, there exists an individual v who has globally 279
more FR than u but who is also locally less risk-averse than u in the sense of AS and of AP. 280
Similarly, let T2 (x) = ¯ x − 2 − [T1 (¯ x) − x − 8]1/3 over the interval [0,T1(¯ x)] where T1 is 281
the function just deﬁned above.14 Function T2 is such that
T2(T1(¯ x))−T2(x)
T1(¯ x)−x < T  
2(x) over this 282
entire interval while T2(x)/x is increasing in x and T   
2 (x) > 0 for some x over this latter 283
interval. In other words, there also exists an individual v who is globally more risk-averse 284
in the sense of AS than u but who is locally less risk-averse in the sense of FR and of AP. 285
To conclude this section, we remark that ⊇FR, ⊇AS and ⊇AP are equivalent for some 286
important classes of utility functions. This is the case if we restrict our attention to power 287
functional forms. Technically, the curvature of power functions is often captured by one 288
single parameter and the AP, FR and AS coefﬁcients may vary monotonically with this 289
parameter.15 The equivalence result follows. 290
4. Conclusion 291
In this paper, we have investigated the basic properties of the “fear of ruin” (FR) coefﬁcient 292
introduced by Aumann and Kurz (1977). First, we have derived an approximation of the 293
insurance premium that an individual would be willing to pay in face of a small chance 294
of losing his entire wealth. This premium has been shown to be proportional to the FR 295
coefﬁcient. We have then provided equivalent characterizations for comparing the FR of 296
two agents. Speciﬁcally, we have shown that an agent v has globally more FR than an 297
agent u if and only if v’s premium to insure against the risk of ruin is always larger than 298
u’s premium. We also have given a characterization of more FR in terms of the properties 299
required of an increasing transformation T, such that v = T ◦ u. Furthermore, we have 300
shownthattheFRcoefﬁcientplaysacrucialroleinstrategicgameswithrisk-averseplayers. 301
Forinstance,inﬁrstpriceauctions,wehavedemonstratedthattheequilibriumbiddingprice 302
of an auctioned object is always higher if auctioneers have more FR, and that uncertainty 303
overthevalueoftheauctionedobjectalwaysleadstheequilibriumbiddingpricetodecrease 304
under prudence. In addition, we have shown that the FR coefﬁcient may be instrumental 305
in simple mortality risk models. Finally, we have compared the FR’s coefﬁcient with other 306
14Observe that T1 appears in the characterization of T2. This can be easily understood once we explain how
these counter-examples were generated. In short, we used the fact that ﬁnding T1 such that we have ⊇FRand ⊇AS
is equivalent, up to a change of reference axes, to ﬁnding T2 such that ⊇FR and ⊇AS. Mathematically, the change
of reference axes is such that T2(x) = ¯ x − T −1
1 (T1(¯ x) − x).
15FoncelandTreich(2003)deriveaformalproofofthisequivalenceforagenericclassofpowerutilityfunctions.
ThisgenericclassUz istheclassofincreasingandconcavefunctionofw thattakestheform
(z+w)1−m
1−m − z1−m
1−m ,and
deﬁned for all positive parameter m  = 1 and over the interval [0,w]. (This result does not hold for all functions
with a single parameter of power form.)P1: GRA
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coefﬁcients of risk-aversion. In particular, we have shown that if an agent v is more risk- 307
averse than u in the sense of Arrow-Pratt, then v has more FR than u. 308
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